AUTHORFoot, Rosemary J.
TITLENuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict
PERIODICAL TITLEInternational Security
DATE PUBLISHEDWinter 1988
VOLUME NUMBER13
ISSUE NUMBER3
PAGE NUMBERS92-112
ISSN0162-2889
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In this article, the author examines the effectiveness of the nuclear threat employed by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower in order to assess the role that threat played in ending the Korean conflict. In addition to paying careful attention to the Eisenhower strategy, the article also details the communist response to that strategy and the Chinese perceptions of nuclear warfare. Until 1954, Chinese propaganda derided the effectiveness of nuclear weapons to end wars. The author deviates from the commonly-held assertion that the nuclear threat resulted in the war’s end, concluding that it did not play the dominant role that Eisenhower later ascribed to it. She argues that communist countries’ emphasis on peaceful coexistence, the economic devastation rendered by conventional bombing, and the cost of the war effort were major factors in the ending of the Korean conflict.


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