AUTHOREllis, Jason D. / Kiefer, Geoffrey D.
TITLECombating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy
PUBLISHERJohns Hopkins University Press
CITYBaltimore, MD

This book vividly demonstrates the ambiguity and complexity of potential proliferation scenarios. It describes the problematic gap between United States' policy and intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD), pointing to the George W. Bush administration’s reliance on faulty intelligence in the decision to go to war with Iraq. In an attempt to understand such gaps, the book presents a series of case studies based on publicly available information addressing WMD-related policy and intelligence issues such as standards of evidence, uncertainties of estimates, strategic surprise, intelligence sharing, and military counterforce operations. The case studies include Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons with China’s support, North Korea’s (DPRK) development of a nuclear program with the former Soviet Union’s support, the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, Russian arms transfers to Iran, the 1993 Yin He interdiction, and the 1998 al-Shifa strike. The concluding chapter discusses the counterproliferation strategy of the Bush administration, identifies challenges to that strategy, and argues for a robust offense, protection against failures of deterrence, and minimization of the consequences of possible future attacks on the U.S. (p. 214). The book includes helpful figures and tables, as well as a list of acronyms and abbreviations.

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