AUTHORBlight, James G. / Welch, David A., Eds.
TITLEIntelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis
CITYLondon, England

This book is a collection of seven essays on the role of U.S., Soviet, and Cuban intelligence organizations during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The editors, James Blight and David Welch, provide introductory and concluding chapters; the latter chapter discusses how intelligence performance should be assessed, asserting that intelligence assessment must take into account policy as well as intelligence. Three empirical chapters discuss the role of intelligence institutions in the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Cuba. The authors describe very different roles of intelligence: the U.S. and the John Kennedy administration needed organizations like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Nikita Khrushchev in the Soviet Union acted as his own intelligence analyst, and Cuban intelligence was sidelined by the ideologies of Fidel Castro. In addition, two analytical essays treat the psychology of intelligence assessment and its politics and organization.

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